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This paper aims at identifying the labour share (wage-productivity gap) as a major factor in 
the evolution of inequality and employment. To this end, we use annual data for the US, UK 
and Sweden over the past forty years and estimate country-specific systems of labour 
demand and Gini coefficient equations. Further to the statistical significance of our models, 
we validate their economic significance through counterfactual simulations. In particular, we 
evaluate the contributions of the labour share to the trajectories of inequality and employment 
during specific time intervals in the post-1990 years. We find that during the nineties the cost 
of a one percent increase in employment was in the range of 0.7%-0.9% higher inequality in 
all three countries. However, in the 2000s, whereas the inequality-employment sensitivity 
ratio slightly fell in the US, it exceeded unity in the countries on the other side of the Atlantic. 
It obtained its highest value in the UK, where a 1% growth in employment was achieved at 
the expense of 1.3% worsening in income inequality. In the light of the significant influence of 
the time-varying labour share on the inequality and employment time paths documented in 




JEL Classification:  D30, E25, E24 
  






Department d’Economia Aplicada 




E-mail: hector.sala@uab.es  
 
                                                 
* We are grateful to the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation for financial support through grant 
ECO2009-07636. We have benefited from discussions with John Hatgioannides. 1 Introduction
This work dwells on the inﬂuence of the labour share (wage-productivity gap) on two
vital macro-labour outcomes: employment and income inequality. Since the late 1960s,
the relationship between macroeconomic activity and inequality has been widely examined
in the literature. In a seminal paper, Schultz (1969, p.83) states that “the secular growth
of labour’s share, which tends to be more equally distributed among persons than that
of proﬁts or property, has undoubtedly worked to reduce over-all inequality of personal
income”. Since the 1970s, though, the harsh reality is that the labour share has mainly
evolved along a downward path. So we are due to ask what are the repercussions of the
fall in the labour share. Our framework of analysis identiﬁes the wage-productivity gap
as an important channel fueling income inequality and supporting employment.
Studies that approach the inequality/macro-activity nexus from a time series per-
spective have mainly followed two avenues: either a measure of inequality (such as the
Gini coeﬃcient or the quintile income shares) acts as the dependent variable in a macro-
labour econometric model, or a parametric distribution is ﬁtted to the observed income
distribution and its estimated parameters are, in turn, regressed on a set of macro-labour
variables.1 These analyses assert that (un)employment is a major channel via which
macroeconomic ﬂuctuations aﬀect the size distribution of personal income.
From the plethora of papers which directly estimate the impact of unemployment on
t h es u m m a r ys t a t i s t i co fi n c o m ei n e q u a l i t y ,i . e .t h eG i n ic o e ﬃcient, our point of depar-
ture hints to justiﬁable methodological and political economy questions. First, can the
positive correlation between the Gini coeﬃcient and unemployment oﬀer a comprehensive
explanation of inequality or is it merely a statistical regularity? Second, which of the de-
terminants of inequality can also produce a positive outcome (e.g. a rise in employment)
that eﬀectively diverts the attention of developed democratic societies from the issue of
increasing inequality by "sweetening" its impact?
This paper contributes to the income distribution literature by postulating that the
labour share (wage-productivity gap) is a major driving force of the evolution of inequality
and employment. In this respect, our aim is to examine how the labour share channel
irrigates the inequality-(un)employment landscape.
In what follows, we ﬁrst produce evidence that over the past four decades a falling
1The majority of the studies examining the inﬂuence of macroeconomic conditions on the size distri-
bution of personal income have followed the inequality regression avenue, strarting with Schultz (1969)
who used a Gini regression, and Blinder and Esaki (1978) who used income shares regressions. The in-
come shares approach addresses the issue of whether unemployment (and other variables) have regressive
or progressive eﬀects on the size distributon of income. Nolan (1988), Bjorklund (1991), and Mocan
(1999) are among the studies that use income shares regressions, while Cysne (2009), and Checchi and
García-Peñalosa (2010) are among those ones estimating a Gini regression. Fewer studies have followed
the parametric distribution avenue which started with Metcalf (1969), Thurow (1970), and continued
recently with Jäntti and Jenkins (2010).
2labour share has been accompanied by a worsening income inequality - the latter has
been particularly emphasized by a variety of authors in both the academia and the press.
These developments have taken place in a globalised environment featuring the interplay
of technological progress, product/labour market policies, and ﬁnancialisation.2 We then
estimate country-speciﬁc models of employment and income inequality equations for the
US, UK and Sweden. We show that the widening wage-productivity gap (i.e. wages
lagging further behind productivity) has, on one hand, signiﬁcantly contributed to the rise
in inequality (measured by the Gini coeﬃcient), and, on the other, boosted employment.
These results not only are in line with the observation by Krugman (1994, p.23) that
“... the United States has achieved low unemployment by a sort of devil’s bargain, whose
price is soaring inequality... ”, but they also show that this is the case across the Atlantic.
It is generally believed that a shift of demand away from unskilled labour towards
skilled labour has led to both increased income inequality in the US and high unem-
ployment in Europe. Atkinson (2001) dubbed this view the ‘Transatlantic Consensus’,
albeit arguing that this consensus is open to question (see also Singh, 2001). Our results
are in stark contrast to the ‘Transatlantic Consensus’, since, like the US, both European
countries in our sample, the "egalitarian" Sweden and "non-egalitarian" UK, are found
to support their employment levels by a devil’s bargain.
Having established the statistical signiﬁcance of our empirical framework of analysis,
we investigate its economic signiﬁcance and measure the dynamic contributions of the
falling labour share to the evolution of inequality and employment. We ﬁnd that during
the 1990s all three countries experienced inelastic inequality-employment sensitivity ratios
in the range of 0.7 to 0.9, i.e. a one percent increase in employment was associated with
less than 1% higher inequality. However, in the 2000s, whereas the inequality-employment
ratio slightly fell in the US, it exceeded unity in the countries on the other side of the
Atlantic. It obtained its highest value in the UK, where a 1% growth in employment was
achieved at the expense of 1.3% worsening in income inequality. This increase was due
to the dramatic rise of the inequality-labour share sensitivity, which almost doubled from
the nineties to the noughties, implying that the same percentage fall in the labour share
in the 1990s led to twice as much the rise in inequality in the 2000s.
Interpreting these sensitivity ratios as ‘tradeoﬀs’ is debatable, since a tradeoﬀ requires
the identiﬁcation of some policy instrument(s) that could directly aﬀect its balance. The
inﬂation-unemployment tradeoﬀ is one such example. Regressing inﬂation on unemploy-
ment is a direct way to measure the tradeoﬀ between the two phenomena, i.e. evaluate
the slope of the Phillips curve. This has profound policy implications, since monetary pol-
i c yi sam a j o rc a u s a lf a c t o ro ft h ei n ﬂation-unemployment tradeoﬀ. In contrast, as it is
2The recent term ‘ﬁnancialisation’ refers to the engagement of non-ﬁnancial businesses in ﬁnancial
markets (Stockhammer, 2004; Milberg and Winkler, 2010).
3rather unclear how to balance an inequality-(un)employment tradeoﬀ,3 the value added of
regressing the Gini coeﬃcient on the unemployment rate (and ﬁnding that unemployment
increases inequality) is questionable.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the evolution of
inequality and the labour share from the mid 1960s to 2008. Section 3 analyses the
anatomy of the labour share channel and outlines our employment and Gini coeﬃcient
relationships. Section 4 gives the estimation results. Section 5 evaluates the contributions
of the labour share to the inequality/employment trajectories during the 1990s and 2000s.
Section 6 concludes our thoughts.
2 A Bird’s Eye View of Inequality and the Labour
Share
2.1 Inequality Coming Back with Vengeance
The increase in inequality has been documented by many authors in both the academia
and the press. Here we present some key developments in the inequality landscape that
point to a worrying regression of inequality after 1980 to levels similar to those of the
pre-WWII era.
In their investigation of wealth and income inequality in the US in 1982-2000, Wolﬀ
and Zacharias (2006) evidence a gain of 9.5 percentage points in the income share of the
top decile (from 33.4% to 42.9%). The inequality gap is further magniﬁed when we look at
the very high end of the distributional spectrum: the share of the top percentile increased
from 9.9 % to a staggering 17.4%. These results are in line with Piketty and Saez (2006)
who ﬁnd that during the 20th century the top percentile has ﬂuctuated from around 18%
before WWI, to only around 8% in the 1960s and 1970s, and back to around 17% by
2000. In a brief overview of trends in income inequality, Mankiw (2010) notes that since
the mid-1970s the share of total income of the top 0.01% (i.e. those with annual income
of more than $11 million) has increased about sixfold.
According to the high pay commission, set up in November 2010 to scrutinise the rising
pay of those at the top of the public and private sectors, the share of the top 0.1% of UK
earners is 5% of national income. The commission further claims that “Wage disparity
between the UK’s top earners and the rest of the working population will soon return to
the levels of the Victorian era...”4
In the Financial Times (‘Stuck in the Middle’, 29/10/2008) we read that “Between
2000 and 2006 the US economy expanded by 18 per cent, whereas real income for the
3The inequality-unemployment tradeoﬀ is discussed in Hellier and Chusseau (2010), among others.
4‘Pay gap widening to Victorian levels’, The Guardian, 16 May 2011, Graham Snowdon.
4median working class dropped by 1.1 per cent ... Meanwhile, the top tenth saw an
improvement of 32 per cent in their incomes, the top 1 per cent a rise of 203 per cent
the top 0.1 per cent a staggering gain of 425 per cent.” Wolﬀ and Zacharias (2006, p. 5)
note that in 2004, the median net worth of the individuals in the Forbes 400 list was $1.5
billion “as compared to the median net worth of $93,000 for all other households.”
As the increase in the share of the top percentile has been accompanied by the ex-
ceptional growth in top executives’ pay relative to the salaries of employees, the issue of
whether the so called "working rich"5 have replaced top capital owners (the "rentiers") at
the top of the economic ladder is open to debate. For example, Wolﬀ and Zacharias (2006)
do not support this issue, whereas Piketty and Saez (2006) argue in its favour. Econo-
mists of the Washington consensus have labelled such a wealth redistribution ‘median
wage stagnation’ and are stunned about the complexity of the problem and its causes.
Others dub it the ‘silent recession’ (Financial Times, ‘Stuck in the Middle’, 29/10/2008).
We should note that, in a globalised world, the rising inequality is not conﬁned to
the US and UK economies. According to Llense (2010, p. 1) “the sharp increase in
globalization and the last privatization wave have promoted the shaping of a market
for executives in France.” In Japan, traditionally considered as an egalitarian society,
inequality has been rising since the eighties. Moriguchi (2010, p. 7) links this increase
to “a faster growth of wage income at the high end of the distribution”. Furthermore,
Bourguignon and Morrisson (2002) examine inequality among world citizens using data
from 1820 to 1992 and ﬁnd that, while the income share of the top decile was relatively
stable about 50 percent throughout the 1950s to the 1970s, it started increasing in 1980,
reaching its highest value of 53.4 percent in 1992 (ibid, Table 1, p. 731-732.)
2.2 Deﬁning the Measures
Our work adopts the Gini coeﬃcient (Gini ratio, or relative income) as the summary
measure of income inequality in a population.6 The most common interpretation of the
G i n is t a t i s t i ci st h ea r e ab e t w e e nt h ec u r v ei naL o r e n zd i a g r a ma n dt h ed i a g o n a l( 4 5 ◦)
line as a ratio of the area below the diagonal. (The Lorenz curve plots the cumulative
population shares, from the poorest to the richest, against their cumulative income shares.)
The values of the Gini coeﬃcient are in the [0,1] range, a higher coeﬃcient is associated
5“Forbes popularised this term. However, the magazine used it in the sense that the wealthiest
Americans hold jobs rather than in the sense that the wealthiest depend mainly on labour income as
their chief source of income.” (Wolﬀ and Zacharias, 2006, p. 12).
6The Gini coeﬃcient is most easily calculated from unordered size income () data as the ‘relative
mean diﬀerence’, i.e., the mean of the diﬀerence between every possible pair of individuals, divided by









5with higher income inequality: zero is the case of perfect equality with each member
of the population receiving exactly the same income, whereas one is the case of perfect
inequality with single member receiving all the income and the rest receiving none.
However, using the above standard deﬁnition, a speciﬁcG i n ic o e ﬃcient value falls short
of immediate comprehension. Shorrocks (2005) oﬀe r sa ni n t u i t i v ea n de a s yt ou n d e r s t a n d
interpretation of the value of the Gini coeﬃcient as a division of a "pie" into two unequal
shares. For example, he explains that a Gini value of 0.40 is obtained from the division of
an aggregate economic pie worth $1 into 90c and 10c. Presenting inequality as “a 2-way
division of a pie in which one person gets 9 times the other is a powerful way of capturing
t h ee x t e n to fi n c o m ed i ﬀerences.” Since the "fair" share in a 2-way division is 0.5, the
Gini value of 0.40 represents the excess share of the richest person (Gini=0 90 − 050).
Put diﬀerently, the Gini value can be comprehended as the excess share of the rich in
a 2-class society. In a 10 person society, the Gini value of 0.40 can be pictured as the
division of a $1 pie between one person receiving 0.50 of the pie and nine people each
getting (0509) ≈0.05. In other words, the share of the richest person is the fair share
0.1 plus the Gini value.
Regarding the labour income share, i.e. the average real wage as a ratio of productivity,










≡ wage gap. (1)
I f ,s a y ,a1 0 %p r o d u c t i v i t yg a i ni sa c c o m p a n i e db ya1 0 %g r o w t hi nt h ea v e r a g er e a lw a g e ,
then the wage gap is zero. However, the lower the wage growth, the more wages trail
productivity gains and thus the higher is the wage gap.
The Economist speaks volumes when reporting that, since 2000, “The fruits of pro-
ductivity gains have been skewed towards the highest earners, and towards companies,
whose proﬁts have reached record levels as a share of GDP” (Special report: Inequality
in America, 2006, June 17). Below we present the time series of the inequality and labour
share measures.
2.3 A Tale of the Time Paths
Figure 1 plots the Gini coeﬃcients for the US, UK and Sweden. This graphic evidence
suggests that, since the late 1970s, income inequality has evolved in terms of upward
‘trends’ rather than ‘episodes’ of falling/increasing inequality. As inequality has been
growing in all three countries, the US has been experiencing the highest levels, followed
closely by the UK and with Sweden approaching rather fast.
7We should also note the intricate association of the labour share to the (real) unit labour cost; the
latter is deﬁned as the average (real) cost of labour per unit of real output.












Characteristically, in the mid/late 1970s, the Gini coeﬃcient was close to 0.35 in the
US, 0.25 in the UK, and 0.20 in Sweden. By 2008 the statistic of inequality reached the
value of 0.44 in the US, 0.40 in the UK, and 0.32 in Sweden. It is important to bear
in mind that, in the US and the UK, whereas the macroeconomic environment of the
stagﬂating 1970s featured rapidly rising unemployment rates and modest levels of income
inequality, the roaring nineties were characterised by relatively low unemployment rates
and ever increasing inequality.
Note, however, that although the levels of inequality witnessed in the two European
countries have been lower than those in the US, they have been growing at much higher
rates over the past 30 years: inequality increased by 60% in the UK and 55% in Sweden,
compared to 15% in the US. Regarding the UK, Atkinson (1997, p.301) noted that the
country “stands out for the sharpness of the rise in recorded income inequality in the
1980s... The apparent fall in the redistributive impact of transfers and direct taxes since
the mid-1980s is circumstantial evidence that policy changes have contributed to the
rise in income inequality” (ibid, p.306). Using both National Accounts annual data and
micro-data from the 1977 Family Expenditure Survey, Nolan (1987) showed that after
the late 1970s the share of top income groups had risen in a way that was unprecedented
since the late 1940s, and this was mostly at the expense of the middle of the distribution.
Regarding Sweden, it is worth pointing out that the breakdown of centralized bargaining
and the subsequent earnings compression of the mid-1980s signalled the upward trend in
inequality over the past thirty years.
Regarding the labour share, although widely assumed in the literature, the theoretical
property of its constancy is strongly refuted by reality. The plots in Figure 2 evidence
the falling labour share in the US since the 1960s, and in the UK and Sweden since the
mid/late 1970s (as explained in Section 4, the labour share is adjusted for self-employment
income).





















It is worth noting that while the US labour share attained its highest value (72%)
in 1961, the European labour shares recorded their top value of 77% in 1975 (UK) and
1977 (Sweden). Clearly, whereas the labour share in the US has been evolving smoothly
around a downward trend, the two labour shares across the Atlantic have been exhibiting
profound ups and downs that decelerated their falling trajectories since the mid 1970s.
The disparity between the highest value of the labour share and its end of sample
(2008) value is 9 percentage points, pp, in the US (72%−63%) ,7p pi nt h eU K( 77%−70%),
and 9 pp in Sweden (77%−68%). We should also point out that both European countries
experienced an accelerated reduction in their labour shares during the nineties, i.e. their
labour shares were falling by more than one percentage point per year. More precisely,
the labour share fall in the UK was 7 pp during 1991-97 (slope= −12) and in Sweden 8
pp during 1990-95 (slope= −16).8
Recent literature has identiﬁed three interrelated factors as responsible for the decline
in the labour shares: globalisation, technological progress, and product and labour market
policies. The mechanisms through which compensation and job creation grow at a rate
slower than economic growth are, among others, trade shares and terms-of-trade prices,
foreign direct investment, oﬀshoring, migration ﬂows, and ﬁnancial openness (Guscina,
2006; IMF, 2007). In addition, technological progress tends to increase returns to capital
and, thus, the capital income share. In turn, in seeking to maintain competitiveness,
the product and labour market policies typically undertaken have tended to weaken the
bargaining position of labour vis-à-vis the ﬁrm (Bentolila and Saint-Paul, 2003; Ellis and
Smith, 2007; Bental and Demouguin, 2010).
Viewing the falling labour shares as the ratiﬁcation of rising proﬁts, it is reasonable
to argue that the inequality-employment sensitivity ratio (i.e the percentage increase in
inequality associated with one percent increase in employment) depends, among other
8As l o p e −1 means that the reduction rate exceeded 1 pp per year over a given period.
8things, on how proﬁts are being spent. Milberg and Winkler (2010) argue that when
the non-ﬁnancial corporate sector channels part of the rise in proﬁts to higher dividend
payments and share buybacks, a leakage is created in the proﬁts—investment—employment
system. A partial, instead of full, recycling of the rise in proﬁts into investment is the
result of ﬁnancialisation which reﬂects the tilt in the focus of non-ﬁnancial sector corporate
strategies towards short-term maximisation of shareholder value at the expense of long-
term growth.
The thesis of this paper is that the falling labour share aggravates inequality and con-
tributes positively to employment. It is worth pointing out that our results contradict the
Neoclassical paradigm (with its representative agent model) that dismissed the link be-
tween income distribution and macroeconomic activity. In addition, since being employed
(rather than unemployed) makes it easier to tolerate increasing inequality, ﬁnding that
the labour share channel links inequality and employment is alarming if income inequality
has adverse eﬀects on economic growth. Although the inequality/growth nexus is beyond
the scope of this paper, we should note that, unlike the Classical hypothesis, the modern
viewpoint of the relationship between inequality and economic development argues that
a more equal distribution of income promotes economic growth (Galor and Moav, 2004;
Galor, 2011).
3 Anatomy of the Labour Share Channel
Given that the labour share represents the part of the economic pie that goes to labour,
rather than proﬁts, distributional issues at the core of this concept remain intact whether
we call it labour income share (wage share) or wage-productivity gap (real unit labour
cost). As the previous section highlighted, the downward sloping trajectory of the labour
share has been accompanied by worsening income inequality. This was pictured in Figures
1, 2 and is also shown in Figure 3 from a country-speciﬁc perspective.


















































We view globalisation as a phenomenon that encapsulates (among other things) the
interactive dynamics of technological progress and product/labour market policies in a
9world of growing inequality. From the statistics and selected literature in Section 2, it
is apparent that globalisation leads to higher employment, whilst it is accompanied by a
more unequal income distribution. Karanassou and Sala (2010) argued that the labour
share is a driving force of employment; in this paper we demonstrate that the wage-
productivity gap is also an important factor prompting inequality. Acknowledging that
the boost in employment is one side of the globalisation coin, and its ﬂip side is the
worsening of inequality, the labour share can be seen as the footprint of the globalised
employment/income inequality mix (Figure 4).9










In particular, in Karanassou and Sala (2010) we argued that the neoclassical picture
of productivity gains being fully translated into wage rises can only prevail in the absence
of dynamics and growth. The incumbent view that the labour income share is neutral to
labour demand was thus challenged. Whilst maintaining the assumption of a one-to-one
relationship between real wages and productivity in the long run, we demonstrated that
productivity growth aﬀects the labour share in the long run due to frictional growth, a
phenomenon generated by the interplay of wage dynamics and productivity growth. In
eﬀect, we showed that the wage-productivity gap instead of being absent in the long run,
transforms to frictional growth. Furthermore, our analytical exposition was validated
empirically: using a sample of seven OECD countries over the 1960-2008 period we found
that the time-varying labour share is a major determinant of employment.
It should be noted, however, that the link between a falling labour share and the
employment boost shies away from the terms of employment. These are associated with
the existence of a national health system, state pension, beneﬁts system, the time it takes
to re-establish beneﬁts, strings attached to receive beneﬁt s ,m i n i m u mw a g e ,a n dl a c ko f
progression. We believe that the deterioration of the latter is taken into account when we
evaluate the link between the falling labour share and rising inequality.
The thrust of this work is to address the sibling pathways of the globalised employ-
ment/income inequality fusion by investigating how the falling labour share (or, equiv-
alently, the widening wage-productivity gap) inﬂuenced the employment trajectory and
9Note that ﬁnancialisation represents a leakage in the labour share—employment channel of Figure 4.
That is, when proﬁts are not fully recycled into investment, the employment support of falling labour
shares is weaker than otherwise.
10solicited the increasing inequality in the US, UK and Sweden over the past four decades.
To this end, we use a system comprising labour demand and inequality equations, and
show that a decrease in the labour share creates more inequality and leads to higher em-
ployment (or lower unemployment).10 Our ﬁndings not only are in line with the point
made in Krugman (1994, p.23) that “... the United States has achieved low unemploy-
ment by a sort of devil’s bargain, whose price is soaring inequality... ”, but they also show
that this is the case on the other side of the Atlantic.
It can be argued that these ﬁndings indicate that the widening wage-productivity gap
has been encouraged by a ‘carrot and stick’ approach - employment being the reward,
insecurity of loosing the job (due to a deterioration in labour conditions) being the threat.
Nevertheless, a debate on the terms of employment and their link to labour demand is
beyond the scope of this paper.
Next we outline our employment and Gini coeﬃcient relationships.
Employment vis-à-vis the Wage Gap
As in Karanassou and Sala (2010), we consider a standard log-linear labour demand
equation:
 = 0 + 1−1 − 2 + 3 + "other" + 1 (2)
where     denote employment, real wages, labour productivity (all in logs), 1 is
a strict white noise error term, and the ’s are positive parameters; the autoregressive
parameter 1  1 captures employment adjustment costs, such as costs of hiring and
ﬁring, search costs, and training costs. Note that productivity () can be thought of
as capturing technological change (this is common in the literature - see, for example,
Blanchard, 2006, p. 17). The "other" explanatory variables refer to real interest rates or
real balances, competitiveness, and private consumption (see Section 4). We should also
p o i n to u tt h a tt h el o gd i ﬀerence between real wage and productivity is a key element in
the Hatton (2007) unemployment rate equation (2), which can also be seen as a dynamic
labour demand equation (p. 480). Finally, equation (2) can be reparameterised as
 = 0 + 1−1 − 2 ( − )+( 3 − 2) + "other" + 1
= 0 + 1−1 − 2 +( 3 − 2) + "other" + 1 (3)
where  stands for the labour share (wage-productivity gap), and higher order lags are
ignored for expositional simplicity.
10It can be shown that when a labour supply equation is added to the system, the unemployment rate
is associated negatively to the labour share. To conserve space, the results are available upon request.
11Gini Coeﬃcient vis-à-vis the Wage Gap
Along a similar line to equation (3), we postulate an autoregressive distributed lag model
for income inequality:
 = 0 + 1−1 − 2 ( − )+( 3 − 2) + 4 + "other" + 2 (4)
where  is the Gini coeﬃcient (in logs),  denotes ﬁnancial corporations proﬁts,
and the ’s are positive parameters with 1  1 The "other" explanatory variables may
include taxes, competitiveness, union density, and beneﬁts. Higher order lags are ignored
for expositional simplicity, and 2 is a strict white noise error term. Although the above
speciﬁcation is along the lines of the reduced form inequality equation in Checci and
García-Peñalosa (2010), it does not include unemployment as an explanatory variable for
reasons we explain below.
It has been argued that higher corporate proﬁts as a share of national income lead
not only to higher investment but to the ‘ﬁnancialisation’ of the industry as well, i.e.
the engagement of non-ﬁnancial businesses in ﬁnancial markets (Stockhammer, 2004;
Milberg and Schöller, 2008; Milberg and Winkler, 2010, among others). Recognising
the link between ﬁnancialisation and ﬁnancial proﬁts (e.g. via fees), the ﬁnding that
the proﬁts of the ﬁnancial sector have a positive impact on the Gini coeﬃcient implies
that ﬁnancialisation has a "direct" adverse eﬀect on inequality. (The indirect eﬀects of
ﬁnancialisation on inequality are via the labour share.)
The Gini coeﬃcient captures inequality by measuring the allocation of income in (real)
monetary terms to the various groups of agents. Therefore, wages, beneﬁts, rewards to
capital or labour, and institutions that facilitate such rewards are legitimate candidate
variables on the right-hand-side of a Gini regression, while adding unemployment as an
explanatory variable risks blurring the picture of analysis. For example, the negative
and insigniﬁcant unemployment coeﬃcient in the Gini equation of Checchi and Garcia-
Peñalosa (2010) using OLS and IV (Table 4, p. 428) becomes positive and signiﬁcant
with 3SLS (Table 5, p. 431). As it is hard to justify such a u-turn of the estimates
on the grounds of endogeneity and cross-equation correlation alone, we believe that the
authors’ ﬁnding “that these simulations contradict the perception that higher inequality
is associated with lower unemployment” (p. 435) drops in face value.
Nevertheless, the belief that higher unemployment increases inequality is reasonable,
since unemployment hits hardest those with low earnings capacity, even when they have a
job (e.g. Björklund, 1991). We should point out that, for at least the past forty years, it
has been recognised that unemployment has distributional eﬀects (e.g. Tobin, 1972). The
inequality/unemployment issue can be addressed by examining the relationship between
the various income classes and the existence of unemployment. Using US data, Blinder
12and Esaki (1978) introduced the approach of regressing the share of the th quintile in
the distribution of income on the overall unemployment rate, and found that a rise in
unemployment causes the share of the two lowest two quintiles to decrease by the same
amount that the share of the highest quintile increases.11
4 Empirical Analysis
4.1 Data and Variable Deﬁnitions
Table 2 presents the variables in the selected speciﬁcations of the labour demand and
inequality equations.12
Table 2. Deﬁnitions of variables.
 labour share (=  − )  trade union density (%)
 real compensation per employee  direct taxes (% of GDP)
 labour productivity (=  − )  indirect taxes (% of GDP)
 GDP at market prices  real balances
 employment  real interest rates (%)
 gini coeﬃcient  competitiveness
 proﬁts of ﬁnancial corporations
total proﬁts of corporations  private consumption
 gross operating surplus of ﬁnancial corporations
total gross operating surplus (% of GDP)
 net operating surplus of ﬁnancial corporations
total net operating surplus 00 dummy (value 1 in 2000)
Note: Variables are in logs unless otherwise indicated.
Sources: OECD (Economic Outlook, Employment and Labour Market Statistics), US
Census Bureau, US Bureau of Economic Analysis, UK Oﬃce for National
Statistics, Institute for Fiscal Studies (London, UK), Statistics Sweden
As in Karanassou and Sala (2010), we follow the European Comission methodology in
their Ameco database and compute the adjusted labour share as
 =
total compensation/dependent employment
GDP at factor costs/total employment
=
total compensation




In this way, total labour compensation includes both dependent and self-employment
compensation, and GDP excludes taxes and subsidies, which are not a component of
11Clearly, the sensitivities of each quintile to the unemployment rate satisfy the cross-equation restric-
tion of summing up to unity. The study of Blinder and Esaki was followed, among others, by Nolan
(1988), Bjorklund (1991), and Mocan (1999).
12Although we have worked with extended datasets for the three economies considered, here we only
report the variables entering the selected estimated equations.
13generated income and need to be excluded from the calculation of the labour income
share. Once the labour share is computed, we retrieve the average wage per employee
(including self-employment) as  = ∗
 ,w h e r e is total employment and  is the
standard measure of GDP at market prices. Note that , , ,a n d (deﬁn e di nT a b l e2 )
are the log counterparts of , ,  and . It follows that the labour share,  = −,
can also be interpreted as the wage-productivity gap. Information on these variables is
obtained from the OECD Economic Outlook.
Regarding income inequality, time series data for the US are supplied by the US Census
Bureau and correspond to  ratios for families. For the UK, the source is the Institute
for Fiscal Studies (see Joyce et al., 2010). Incomes are net of direct taxes and measured
at the household level. For Sweden, data are supplied by Statistics Sweden and consist
on after-tax  coeﬃcients for households.
We capture the role played by ﬁnancial proﬁts in shaping the upward trend in income
inequality by using diﬀerent variables in each country, depending on data availability.
Given that the US Census Bureau supplies data for both corporate ﬁnancial and non-
ﬁnancial proﬁts, we construct the variable  as the ratio of ﬁnancial proﬁts over total
proﬁt s . F o rt h eU K ,t h ev a r i a b l eu s e da sap r o x yo fﬁnancial proﬁts is the ratio of
ﬁnancial corporations gross operating surplus over total gross operating surplus, , while
in Sweden the same ratio was constructed in terms of net operating surplus, .13




percentage of GDP; real interest rates (),d e ﬁned as the diﬀerence between the nominal
interest rate and the inﬂation rate (i.e. the rate of change in the GDP deﬂator); real
money balances (),d e ﬁned as a broad measure of money supply over the GDP deﬂator;
a standard measure of competitiveness (), deﬁned as the ratio of import prices over
the GDP deﬂator (in logs); and private household consumption () as percentage of GDP.
Information on these variables is taken from the OECD.
4.2 Estimation Results
Our econometric methodology is based on the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL)
approach (or bounds testing approach) which has been shown to yield consistent short-
and long-run estimates and has desirable properties even in the face of unit roots (see
Pesaran, 1997; Pesaran and Shin, 1999; Pesaran, Shin and Smith, 2001). Since an ARDL
equation can be reparameterised in error-correction form and its long-run solution can
13US data on proﬁts are net since they include inventory valuation and capital consumption adjust-
ments. For the UK, the Oﬃce for National Statistics does not supply the net operating surplus. While
both gross and net surpluses are available in Sweden, we don’t ﬁnd any signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the
Gini equation estimates when using either of the two. However, the limitation in Sweden is that these
variables are available from 1993 onwards. This implies that  enters the equation as a dummy taking
value 0 from 1978 to 1992, which is equivalent to say that in the earlier part of the sample this ratio had
no role in shaping inequality in Sweden.
14be interpreted as the cointegrating vector of its variables, the ARDL procedure can be
viewed as an alternative to the standard integration/cointegration techniques.
The empirical labour demand and income inequality equations are augmented versions
of the stylised model (3)-(4). Our selected speciﬁcations attempt to optimise the ﬁtf o r
each country, and their dynamics are determined by the optimal lag-length algorithm
of the Schwarz information criterion. All equations are dynamically stable and pass the
standard diagnostic tests (for linearity, no serial correlation, homoskedasticity, normality,
and structural stability) at conventional signiﬁcance levels. As shown in Figures 5a, 6a,
and 7a the ﬁtted trajectories of employment and Gini coeﬃcients track closely the actual
ones. To take into account the potential endogeneity and cross equation correlation, we
estimate the employment/inequality model with 3SLS.14 Table 3 presents the estimated
systems of equations for the US, UK, and Sweden. We should note that although the
labour demand and Gini regressions share a common structure among the three economies,
they also have idiosyncratic terms as indicated by the general-to-speciﬁc element of our
estimation procedure.
The labour demand side of the empirical models has the following characteristics.
The autoregressive estimates measure employment persistence (due to labour adjustment
costs) and are similar in all three economies, ranging from 0.83 to 0.87. The signiﬁcant
parameter of the labour share conforms with the requirements of a typical labour demand
equation, since its wage component has the expected negative eﬀect, and the productivity
component can be seen as embodying the positive inﬂuence of capital stock and technical
progress (Manning, 1993, among others).
Ranking the countries according to the elasticity of employment with respect to the
wage-productivity gap, we have that the elasticity is substantially larger in the US than
in the two European countries. In particular, the long-run labour share elasticity in the







that diﬀerentiates labour demand conditions in the US from those in Europe is that, in
addition to the wage eﬀect via the labour share, wages have a further direct negative
impact on employment. This means that the wage elasticity of labour demand in the US
is more than double than that in the UK and Sweden. Furthermore, the inﬂuence of the
monetary conditions on employment is captured through real balances in the US, and real
interest rates in the UK and Sweden. Finally, while there is no demand-side inﬂuence in
the US, our estimations identify private consumption in the UK and competitiveness in
Sweden as relevant employment determinants.
14The 3SLS results do not diﬀer substantially from the OLS ones which are available upon request.
15Table 3. Labour demand () - inequality () systems, 3SLS.
US, 1962-2008















0:ˆ ()=−ˆ ():Wald test [2(1)]=629
[0012]
;    =0 010














0:ˆ ()=−ˆ ():Wald test [2(1)]=018
[0669]




















0:ˆ ()=−ˆ ():Wald test [2(1)]=324
[0072]
;    =0 008




















0:ˆ ()=−ˆ ():Wald test [2(1)]=983
[0002]



















0:ˆ ()=−ˆ ():Wald test [2(1)]=026
[0613]
;    =0 011



















0:ˆ ()=−ˆ ():Wald test [2(1)]=111
[0292]
;    =0 040
Instruments: ,−1,−2,−1,−1,,−1,−2,,−1,−1,−2,,00
Notes: ∆ denotes the diﬀerence operator; p-values in brackets;
ˆ () and ˆ () are the estimated coeﬃcients on real wages and labour productivity.
16The income inequality side of the empirical models has the following features. The
wage-productivity gap is a signiﬁcant determinant of inequality in all three economies.
It is interesting to observe that the Gini equations diﬀer substantially in their degree of
inertia and persistence in both the Anglo-Saxon countries is quite high (0.78 in the US,
0.70 in the UK) compared to a value of 0.32 in Sweden, the country with the lowest level
of income inequality. As a result, the long-run elasticity of the Gini ratio with respect to
the labour share is higher in the Anglo-Saxon countries than in Sweden: a one percent
fall in the labour share increases inequality by 1.82% in the US, 1.7% in the UK, and
1.15% in Sweden.
Another feature common in the Gini regressions is the upward pressure of the proﬁts
of ﬁnancial corporations on income inequality. Note, however, that although the  and
 variables are signiﬁcant at conventional levels in the US and UK, the ﬁnancial sector
variable  is signiﬁcant at the 25% level in Sweden (though we believe this is probably due
to the lack of data availability prior to 1993). Finally, the income inequality estimations




are signiﬁcant in the US (with the expected negative sign),
indirect taxes () in the UK (with the expected positive sign), and union density ()
in Sweden (with the expected negative sign). From the group of foreign-market related
variables, competitiveness () worsens inequality in the US (a big economy with a
large current account deﬁcit) and reduces inequality in Sweden (a small economy with a
current account surplus).
5D y n a m i c C o n t r i b u t i o n s
In the previous section we assessed the statistical signiﬁcance of the labour share factor in
the labour demand and Gini coeﬃcient equation system. Here we examine its economic
signiﬁcance by measuring how it contributed to employment and income inequality over
speciﬁc periods in our sample. We ﬁrst present the conceptual underpinnings of the
‘contributions’ measure and then evaluate our simulation results.
5.1 Conceptual Underpinnings
One of the salient features of our dynamic modelling approach is that we regard a change
in an exogenous variable at a point in time as an impulse, i.e. a one-oﬀ " s h o c k "t ot h e
dependent variable. Deﬁning the shock as a change in an exogenous variable, rather than
as a change in the residuals of a behavioural equation,15 has a clear advantage: it gives
15Blanchard (2009, p. 220) correctly points out that “The use of "shocks" is fraught with philosophical,
but also with practical, diﬃculties: Technological shocks, animal spirits, changes in perceived uncertainty,
etc. all have deeper causes, which themselves have even deeper causes, and so on.”
17rise to (dynamic) contributions, a measure that shows how the endogenous variable of a
dynamic equation responds to the actual changes in an exogenous variable over a sample
interval.
The most pedagogical illustration of the concept of dynamic contributions can be given
in the context of a simple AR(1) model:
 = −1 +  (1 − ) where ||  1 (5)
The impulse response function (IRF) of the stochastic process (5) to a one-oﬀ unit change
in the exogenous variable  is
IRF :
time   +1  +2   +1 0 
responses  (1 − )  (1 − )  (1 − )2   (1 − )10 
 (6)
Note that a one-time unit shock will have an immediate unit× (1 − ) impact on the
endogenous variable, while the future eﬀects of the shock decline in a geometric fashion.








where persistence is deﬁned as the sum of future responses (i.e. the responses in the
aftermath of the shock), short-run sensitivity refers to the contemporaneous response,
and the long-run sensitivity is given by the sum of all responses.
On the basis of the above analysis, we measure the contributions of the exogenous
variable  to the evolution of the dependent variable  over a speciﬁct i m ei n t e r v a lo f
periods, say  +1to  + , by sequentially adding up the IRFs of the respective shocks
during the speciﬁcp e r i o d . W ed e ﬁn et h es h o c ka te a c hp o i n ti nt i m ea st h ec h a n g ei n
the  series from period  to  + : ∇+ = + − ,w h e r e∇ denotes the backward
diﬀerence of  periods,  =1 2. The IRFs of the dependent variable to these shocks
are ⎡
⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢
⎣
 +1  +2   + 
IRF1 : 11 12  1
IRF2 : − 22  2
 −−  
IRF : −−  
⎤
⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
 (8)
where IRF denotes the response function of the endogenous variable to the th shock,
and  is the response to shock  in time  + . Note that the diagonal elements in
matrix (8) denote the respective contemporaneous -responses to the th shock, whereas
t h ee l e m e n t sa b o v et h ed i a g o n a ld e n o t et h e-responses in period + to the shocks which
18occurred in past periods. Therefore, the ( + )-period contribution can be obtained as
the sum of all responses in this period.
In other words, the contributions of the exogenous variable  to the trajectory of the
endogenous variable for the given interval are given by the following time series:












which is equivalent to the disparity between the actual (ﬁtted) and simulated values at
period  +   =1 
In the context of a model where the labour share is the driving force of employment
and income inequality, we illuminate the analytics of the contributions measure through
an autoregressive AR(1) process. (The simple static case is analysed in the Appendix.)
Contributions: AR1 Case
Let  (say, employment) depend on  (say, the labour share) and suppose that  follows
the AR(1) stochastic process (5), i.e.  = −1 + (1 − ), where (in the light of our
results in Section 4) 0.W e ﬁx  = 0 for  =1 . Thus, we can express the
shock series as
 ≡∇  =  − 0 (10)
and the size over the speciﬁcp e r i o di s
 = ∇ =  − 0 (11)
In this case the responses of  to the changes in  (shocks) are
⎡
⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢
⎣
 =1  =2   = 
IRF1  (1 − )(1 − 0)  (1 − )∇11   (1 − )−1∇11
IRF2 −−  (1 − )∇22   (1 − )−2∇22
 −−  
IRF −−   (1 − )( − 0)
⎤
⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
 (12)
and the contribution of  to the evolution of  over the [1] interval is measured by the
sum of all responses in the last column of the above matrix (see also equation (9)):




−∇+ (1 − )( − 0)=( frictional impact on )+ (1 − )()
(13)
19In turn, unlike the white noise case, the sensitivity of  to the change in  over the
whole period depends on the size of the shock:
(frictional impact on )+ (1 − )()

=





Note that the frictional impact is nulliﬁed in the long run, since the matrix (12) becomes
redundant. A long-run analysis of the AR(1) model shows that all temporary shocks
dissipate with time, while a permanent shock (say, a decrease in the labour share) causes
employment to increase by  times the size of the permanent shock. However, in a ﬁnite
time period the sensitivity (elasticity) of  with respect to  depends on the size of the
shock. In short,
• if  =0then the elasticity (sensitivity) of employment () with respect to the labour
share () is zero;
• if 0 then the elasticity of  with respect to  is a weighted average of each
period’s shocks (∇) as a percentage of the size of the shock, i.e. the overall
change in  in the given period ( − 0)
Along the same lines, if we let  (the Gini coeﬃcient) to follow an AR(1) process
 = −1 +  (1 − ) ||  1 (15)
the contributions are




−∇ + (1 − )( − 0)=( frictional impact on )+ (1 − )()
(16)
and the elasticity of  with respect to  is
(frictional impact on )+ (1 − )()

=






A similar reasoning applies to the above equation as for the  sensitivity in equation (14).
Finally, the inequality cost for the employment boost due to the fall in the labour








−∇ +  (1 − )( − 0)
 (1 − )
−1 X
=1
−∇ +  (1 − )( − 0)
=








20Note that in a dynamic model the sensitivity ratio of inequality and employment ()
does not depend on the size of the shock when  =  Naturally,
• the smaller the diﬀerence between (i) the autoregressive parameters (, ) and (ii)
the labour share elasticities (, ) of the two equations, the smaller the inﬂuence of
the size of the shock on the sensitivity ratio.
5.2 Evaluating the Labour Share Contributions
We evaluate the contributions of the labour share to the inequality and employment
trajectories of each country by applying the technique described in the previous section.
To this end we carry out counterfactual simulations by ﬁxing the labour share, in the
system estimations of Table 3, at its value at the start of a particular time interval. It
is important to point out that ﬁxing the labour share at a speciﬁc value over a given
time period, we eﬀectively "lock in" the distance between wages and productivity by
adjusting accordingly the wage component, while allowing the productivity series (and
thus employment) to move "freely" in the equation system. Therefore, the contribution
of the labour share to the employment trajectory is measured without the risk of being
contaminated by spillovers.
In the US, the labour share fell from 66.4% in 1992 to 64% in 2000 and to 63% by
2008 (see Figure 5b). We measure the eﬀect of these wage gaps on the Gini coeﬃcient and
employment time paths over the 1992-00 and 2000-08 periods by keeping the labour share
constant at its 1992 and 2000 values, respectively, and simulating the estimated system.
The solid and dotted lines in Figures 5c-f plot the actual and simulated trajectories of the
Gini coeﬃcient and employment; the disparity between the actual and simulated series
measures the dynamic contributions of the wage gap to the variable under examination.
In particular, Figure 5c deals with the question “Had the labour share remained at
66.4%, i.e. at its 1992 value, what would have been the value of the Gini coeﬃcient
in 2000?” The distance between the solid and dotted lines in Figure 5b measures the
cumulation of "shocks" experienced in each year; by 2000 the magnitude of the labour
share shocks was -2.4 percentage points. In turn, the distance between the solid and
dotted lines in Figure 5c measures the dynamic contributions of the labour share to the
Gini coeﬃcient time path. We thus ﬁnd an elasticity of the Gini coeﬃcient with respect





, i.e. a one percent fall in the labour
share worsened inequality by 2.17% in the US over the 1992-00 period. Or, alternatively,




0664−064 =1 33, where Gini and LS are the level values of the respective variables.
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Nevertheless, as shown in Figure 5d, the inequality increase was accompanied by a rise
in employment. Note that an extra 14.245 million (136.901-122.656) jobs were created
in response to the widening wage-productivity gap, which implies that the elasticity of






.T h e o v e r a l l
sensitivity (elasticity) ratio is
∆
∆ =0 71,i . e .ao n ep e r c e n ti n c r e a s ei ne m p l o y m e n ti s
created at the expense of 0.71% deterioration of inequality.
In a similar fashion, the contributions of the labour share to the Gini coeﬃcient and
employment are calculated for the US during the 2000s and are portrayed in Figures 5e-f,
while Figures 6 and 7 plot the labour share contributions in the UK and Sweden. Figures
226a and 7a depict the evolution of the labour share in the UK and Sweden during the
periods under examination. In the UK the labour share fell from 74.5% in 1990 to 69%
in 1997, then increased to 72.3% by 2001 and ﬁnally fell to 69.7% by 2008. In Sweden the
labour share dropped by 8.5 percentage points (from 74.2% to 62.7%) during the recession
of the ﬁrst half of the nineties, increased to 69.4% by 2001, and then fell slightly to 68.1%










for the three countries during the respective simulation periods
a r es u m m a r i s e di nT a b l e6 .
Table 6. Labour share elasticities of inequality and employment.
US UK Sweden
92-00 00-08 90-97 97-01 01-08 90-95 95-01 01-08
%
∆∆ -2.17 -0.94 -0.55 -0.51 -1.08 -0.54 -0.67 -2.55
∆∆ -3.06 -1.47 -0.73 -0.57 -0.83 -0.66 -0.96 -2.35
∆∆ 0.71 0.64 0.75 0.89 1.30 0.82 0.69 1.09
The following points are worth noting. First, although inequality and employment in
the US were highly elastic with respect to the falling labour share in the nineties, almost
four times more elastic than those in the European countries, their sensitivity ratio was
lower than that in the UK and Sweden: the cost of a one percent boost in employment
in the US was a 0.71% increase in inequality - the European cost was 0.75% in the UK
and 82% in Sweden.
Second, in the UK a one percent increase in employment has been achieved at the
expense of higher percentage increases in inequality throughout the years. This was due





1 9 9 0 - 9 7p e r i o dt ot h e2 0 0 1 - 0 8o n e ,i m p l y i n gt h a tt h es a m ep e r c e n t a g ef a l li nt h el a b o u r
share in the 1990s led to twice as much the rise in inequality in the 2000s. Over the
2001-08 period the sensitivity ratio was the highest in the sample with a 1% employment
increase being obtained at the cost of 1.3% deterioration in inequality. In contrast, the US
displayed a sensitivity ratio of 0.64 in the noughties, reﬂecting the lowest inequality cost
in the sample associated with a 1% rise in employment due to the falling labour share.
Third, similar to the US in the nineties, Sweden experienced the highest inequality
and employment elasticities with respect to the labour share during the noughties. The
main diﬀerence, however, is that Sweden exhibits an elastic sensitivity ratio of 1.09 in the
2000s compared with the lower
∆
∆ =0 71 in the US during the 1990s.
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25F i n a l l y ,o b s e r v e ,t h a to u to ft h ee i g h tt i m ei n t e r v a l sw ee x a m i n e ,t h e r ea r eo n l yt w o
periods during which the labour share is increasing: 1997-2001, the ﬁrst labour term
in the post-Thatcher UK, and the 1995-2001 recovery period in Sweden. In the case
of rising labour shares, the higher the sensitivity ratio
∆
∆ , the higher the economic
beneﬁts. According to Table 6, a 1% decrease in employment was accompanied by 0.89%
less inequality in the UK and 0.69% less inequality in Sweden. So in the second half of
the nineties the UK performed better than Sweden, since it achieved a larger reduction
in inequality for the same employment loss.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we examined how the falling labour share (or, equivalently, the widening
wage-productivity gap) inﬂuenced the employment trajectory and solicited the increasing
inequality in the US, UK and Sweden over the past four decades. Using annual data,
we estimated systems of labour demand and Gini coeﬃcient equations with the aim to
optimise the ﬁti ne a c hc o u n t r y .
Having validated, in statistical terms, the labour share as a major driving force of
inequality and employment, we conﬁrmed the economic signiﬁcance of our results via
counterfactual simulations that measured the contributions of the wage-productivity gap
to the evolution of the two series, and evaluated the labour share elasticities of inequality
and employment (and the corresponding sensitivity ratios).
A c c o r d i n gt oo u rﬁndings, as labour shares were falling during the nineties, the
inequality-employment sensitivity ratio in the US
90−00 was lower than that in the UK
90−97 and
Sweden
90−95 : a one percent increase in employment was supported at the expense of higher in-
equality by 0.71% in the US, 0.75% in the UK, and 0.82% in Sweden. In the two simulation
periods during which labour shares were rising, i.e. 1997-2001 in the UK and 1995-2001 in
Sweden, the UK achieved a larger reduction in inequality than Sweden (0.89% compared
to 0.69%) for the same percentage loss in employment. This picture of the two European
countries is in striking contrast to that in the noughties. In particular, we found that
the inequality-employment sensitivity ratio was much more elastic in the UK and Sweden
than in the US in the 2000s. That is, as the labour shares were falling, the cost of one
percent boost in employment was an increase in inequality of 0.64% in the US, 1.30% in
the UK, and 1.09% in Sweden.
Acknowledging the crucial impact of the labour share on the inequality and employ-
ment time paths, the evolution of the wage-productivity gap deserves the attention of
policy makers. Although an investigation of which macro-labour factors are driving the
labour share was beyond the scope of this paper, we endeavour to address this substan-
tive theme in future work. It should also be worth examining to what extent the various
26income groups beneﬁt/loose from falling labour shares.
The empirical evidence that the falling labour share leads to higher Gini coeﬃcients,
while supporting employment, suggests that the attention of developed democratic soci-
eties is diverted away from the issue of increasing income inequality through "sweeten-
ing" its impact. Or, as George Monbiot opined, “Governments ensure that we are thrown
enough scraps to keep us quiet, while the ultra-rich get on with the serious business of loot-
ing the global economy and crushing attempts to hold them to account.” (The Guardian,
‘To us, it’s an obscure shift of tax law. To the City, it’s the heist of the century’, 8 Feb
2011.)
Nevertheless, it is vital to bear in mind, especially in the precarious post-2008 era, that
in an environment of increasing inequality, countries with high or rising unemployment
rates may have to confront tense socioeconomic conditions.
Appendix
Contributions: Static Case
Let  (employment) depend on  (labour share):
 =  (19)
where (as shown in Section 4) 0. Fixing  = 0 for  =1 ,t h es h o c ks e r i e sa n d
the size over the speciﬁc period are given by equations (10)-(11):
 ≡∇  =  − 0    = ∇ =  − 0
The responses in matrix (8) are
⎡
⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢
⎣
 =1  =2  =3   = 
IRF1 :  (1 − 0)0 0 0
IRF2 : −  (2 − 0)0 0
 −−  (3 − 0)  0
−−−  
IRF : −−−   ( − 0)
⎤
⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
 (20)
Over the speciﬁc period, we measure the contribution of the  shocks to  as the
disparity between its actual (ﬁtted) and simulated values at period :
 − 0 =  − 0 =  ( − 0)= ().( 2 1 )
Alternatively, the contributions at the end of the period are obtained by applying eq. (9)
to matrix (20), i.e. adding up all responses in its last column:
 X
=1
 =0+0+0  +  ( − 0)




 ( − 0)

=  (22)
Similarly, let us consider that  (the Gini coeﬃcient) also depends on  (the labour
share):
 =  (23)
Along the above lines, we measure the contribution of  to  and the sensitivity of  with
respect to  as:




Therefore, the sensitivity ratio of inequality () and employment () as a result of the







Note that in the absence of dynamics the sensitivity ratio does not depend on the size of
the change in the labour share.
References
[1] Atkinson, A.B. (1997): “Bringing Income Distribution in from the Cold”, The Economic
Journal, vol. 107, pp. 297-321.
[2] Atkinson, A.B. (2001): “A Critique on the Transatlantic Consensus on Rising Income
Inequality”, World Economy, vol. 24, pp. 433-452.
[3] Bental, B. and Demouguin, D. (2010): “Declining labor shares and bargaining power: An
institutional explanation”, Journal of Macroeconomics, vol. 32, pp. 443-456.
[4] Bentolila, S. and Saint-Paul, G. (2003): “Explaining movements in the labor share”, Con-
tributions to Macroeconomics, vol. 3 (1),A r t i c l e9 .
[5] Björklund, A. (1991): “Unemployment and income distribution: time-series evidence from
Sweden”, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, vol. 93, 457—¨ 465.
[6] Blanchard, O.J. (2006): “European Unemployment”, Economic Policy, January, pp. 6-59.
[7] Blancard, O.J. (2009): “The State of Macro”, Annual Review of Economics, vol. 1, pp.
209-228.
[8] Blinder, A. and H. Esaki (1978): “Macroeconomic activity and income distribution in the
postwar United States”, The Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 60(4), pp. 604—609.
[9] Bourguignon, F. and Morrisson, C. (2002): “Inequality Among World Citizens: 1820-1992”,
The American Economic Review, vol. 92, pp. 727-744.
[10] Checchi, D. and C. García-Peñalosa (2010): “Labour Market Institutions and the Personal
Distribution of Income in the OECD”, Economica, vol. 77, pp. 413—450.
[11] Cysne, R.P. (2009): “On the Positive Correlation between Income Inequality and Unem-
ployment”, The Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 91(1), 218—226.
28[12] Ellis, L., and K. Smith (2007): “The Global Upward Trend in the Proﬁt Share”, BIS
Working Paper No. 231, July, Bank of International Settlements.
[13] Galor, O. (2011): “Inequality, Human Capital Formation and the Process of Development”,
NBER Working Paper No. 17058.
[14] Galor, O., and O. Moav (2004): “From Physical to Human Capital Accumulation: Inequal-
ity and the Process of Development”, Review of Economic Studies, vol. 71, pp. 1001-1026.
[15] Guscina, A. (2006): “Eﬀects of Globalization on Labor’s Share in National Income”, IMF
Working Paper 06/294, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.
[16] Hatton, T.J. (2007): “Can Productivity Growth Explain the NAIRU? Long-Run Evidence
from Britain, 1871—1999”, Economica, vol. 74, pp. 475-491.
[17] Hellier, J., and N. Chusseau (2010): “Globalization and the Inequality—Unemployment
Tradeoﬀ”, Review of International Economics, vol. 18, 1028-1043.
[18] IMF (2007): “The globalization of labor”, World Economic Outlook, April, IMF: Washing-
ton.
[19] Jäntti, M. and S.P. Jenkins (2010): “The impact of macroeconomic conditions on income
inequality”, Journal of Economic Inequality, vol. 8, pp. 221-240.
[20] Joyce, R., A. Muriel, D. Phillips, and L. Sibieta (2010): “Poverty and Inequality in the UK:
2010”, IFS Commentary No. 116, IFS: London.
[21] Karanassou, M. and H. Sala (2010): “The Wage-Productivity Gap Revisited: Is the Labour
Share Neutral to Employment?”, IZA Discussion Paper No. 5092,I Z A :B o n n .
[22] Krugman, P. (1994): “Past and Prospective Causes of High Unemployment”, Economic
Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, issue Q IV, pp. 23-43.
[23] Llense, F. (2010): “French CEOs’ compensations: What is the cost of a mandatory upper
limit?”, CESifo Economic Studies, vol. 56 (2), pp. 165-191.
[24] Mankiw, N.G.(2010): “Spreading the Wealth Around: Reﬂections Inspired by Joe the
Plumber”, NBER Working Paper No. 15846.
[25] Manning, A. (1993): “Wage bargaining and the Phillips curve: the identiﬁcation and spec-
iﬁcation of aggregate wage equations”, The Economic Journal, vol. 103, pp. 98-118.
[26] Milberg, W. and D. Schöller (2008): “Globalization, Oﬀshoring and Economic Insecurity in
Industrialized Countries”, Background paper for United Nations Department of Economic
and Social Aﬀairs.
[27] Milberg, W., and D. Winkler (2010): “Financialisation and the dynamics of oﬀshoring in
the USA”, Cambridge Journal of Economics, vol. 34, 275-293.
[28] Metcalf, C.E. (1969): “The size distribution of personal income during the business cycle”,
American Economic Review, vol. 59 (4), 657—668.
[29] Mocan, H.N. (1999): “Structural unemployment, cyclical unemployment and income in-
equality”, Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 81 (1), 122—135.
[30] Moriguchi, C. (2010): “Top wage incomes in Japan, 1951-2005”, The Journal of the
Japanese and International Economies, vol. 32 (1), pp. 492-496.
[31] Nolan, B. (1987): “Cyclical Fluctuations in Factor Shares and the Size Distribution of
Income”, Review of Income and Wealth, vol. 33, 193-210.
[32] Nolan, B. (1988-89): “Macroeconomic conditions and the size distribution of income: ev-
idence from the United Kingdom”, Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, vol. 11(2),
196—221.
29[33] Pesaran, M.H. (1997): “The Role of Economic Theory in Modelling the Long Run”, The
Economic Journal, vol. 107(440), pp. 178-91.
[34] Pesaran, M.H. and Shin, Y. (1999): “An Autoregressive Distributed-Lag Modelling Ap-
proach to Cointegration Analysis” in Econometrics and Economic Theory in the Twentieth
Century: The Ragnar Frisch Centennial Symposium, edited by Strom, S., Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, pp. 371-413.
[35] Pesaran, M.H., Y. Shin, and Smith, R.J. (2001): “Bounds testing approaches to the analysis
of level relationships”, Journal of Applied Econometrics, vol. 16, pp. 289-326.
[36] Piketty, T. and Saez, E. (2006): “The Evolution of Top Incomes: A Historical and Inter-
national Perspective”, The American Economic Review, vol. 96, 200-205.
[37] Schultz, P.T. (1969): “Secular Trends and Cyclical Behavior of Income Distribution in the
United States: 1944-1965”, NBER, http://www.nber.org/chapters/c4341
[38] Shorrocks, A. (2005): “Inequality values and unequal shares”, paper presented at the UNU-
WIDER Jubilee Conference: WIDER thinking ahead: The future of development economics,
17-18 June 2005, Helsinki, Finland.
[39] Singh, A. (2001): “Income Inequality in Advanced Economies: A Critical Examination
of the Trade and Technology Theories and an Alternative Perspective”, ESRC Centre for
Business Research, Working Paper 219.
[40] Stockhammer, E. (2004): “Financialisation and the Slowdown of Accumulation”, Cam-
bridge Journal of Economics, vol. 28, 719-741.
[41] Thurow, L.C. (1970): “Analyzing the American income distribution”, American Economic
Review, vol. 60(2), 261—269.
[42] Tobin, J. (1972): “Inﬂation and Unemployment”, The American Economic Review, vol.
62(1), pp. 1-18.
[43] Wolﬀ, E.N. and Zacharias, A. (2006): “Wealth and Income Inequality: Who’s at the Top of
the Economic Ladder?”, T h eL e v yE c o n o m i c sI n s t i t u t eo fB a r dC o l l e g e ,L I M E WR e p o r t ,
December 2006.
30